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Resource Movement and the Legal System
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
In The Problem of Social Cost Ronald Coase identified transaction
costs as the main impediment to the free and efficient flow of resources.
Transaction costs were what made a legal system important to private
ordering. Coase wrote about several common law disputes among
neighbors whose economic activities conflicted with one another.1 One of
them was Sturges v. Bridgman, the nineteenth century British nuisance case
between the two occupants of a duplex building sharing a party wall.2
Octavius Sturges was a prominent London pediatrician who specialized in
childrens' respiratory diseases, such as pneumonia. Frederick Horatio
Bridgman was a prominent confectioner to Queen Victoria, whose process
for making sweets required him to use a mechanical mortar & pestle to
pulverize substances such as chocolate.3 The nuisance dispute arose when
Sturges complained that Bridgman's machine, with its repetitive pounding,
made it impossible for Sturges to use his stethoscope to diagnose his
patients.
Coase argued that if high transaction costs did not interfere, private
bargaining would provide a solution to the problem of conflicting uses
which he characterized as efficient -- namely, the right to continue would be
given to the person who valued it most. 4 For example, if the pediatrician
valued the right to relative silence at £100, while the confectioner valued
the right to conduct his business at £60, the efficient solution would
preserve the pediatrician's £100 value over the confectioner's £60 value.
Alternative solutions might preserve the ability of both parties to
operate, however, generating a social value of £160. Coase did not consider
these, because the tiny market he focused on was too small to include them.
His was concerned with transaction costs, and on his assumptions the only
parties who could transact were Sturges and Bridgman, and only with each
other. This tiny microcosm was a market because Sturges and Bridgman
were locked together by virtue of their own previous investments.
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of
Iowa.
1
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
2
Sturges vs. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879).
3
For more on the players and the facts, see A.W.B. Simpson, Coase v.
Pigou Reexamined, 25 J.LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996).
4
Coase, Social Cost, supra note __ at 16

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343169

Hovenkamp

Resource Movement and Legal System

Oct. 2013, 2

But transaction costs are only a portion of the costs of locating the
best place for resources. Considering all relevant costs usually requires us
to focus on larger markets and longer time periods than the micromarkets
that inhabit Coase. This has occurred in the law and economics of
automobile accidents, where assumptions about the high costs of bargaining
have turned attention to the overall markets where automobiles operate
rather than individual pairwise conflicts.5 When we refocus our attention in
this way, the results that Coase described as efficient are frequently
suboptimal.
Further, one important source of cost savings is determining where
resources should be assigned initially, thus limiting the occasions and costs
for further movement. These costs are higher as initial resource investment
is less coordinated, more costly, and more specialized as to activity and
location. Further, determining the initial location of resources invariably
requires us to consider the interests of larger numbers of players,
encompassing the entire market in which resources move around. Markets
like those envisioned in The Problem of Social Cost, which move resources
only by unanimous consent, work more poorly as the number of participants
increases.6
Coase himself realized that in such cases government
intervention may be preferable even for relatively simple conflicts
traditionally analyzed under the common law of nuisance or trespass.
The Costs of Movement
Moving things from one place to another is costly. I may have a
second television that would be of better use in my son's apartment, because
he has none. If he values it there more than I value it here, moving it might
be a good idea. But I live in Iowa City while he is in New York. Moving
the television to New York might cost $150, and he could buy a good used
one or perhaps a small new one in New York for less. In that case moving
the television actually decreases net value even though he values my
television by more than I do.
Most people spend substantial time considering the costs of moving
resources around, such as when we decide where to live in relation to work,
where to go on vacation, where to shop and how to organize a multistore
trip, or whether to shop in person or online. The best course of action is
usually to get our plan right the first time, for fixing it later costs more.
A great deal of classical and neoclassical economics paid
surprisingly little attention to the idea that the movement of resources is

5
6

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See discussion infra, text at notes ___.
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costly.7 In economic models resources often move without friction from
lower value to higher value positions until the economy is in equilibrium, or
a steady state in which no further gains from resource movement are
possible. Cambridge economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, writing in the 1920s
and 1930s, was deeply concerned about the costs of moving resources,8 but
prior to the time of Coase he was somewhat exceptional.
Coase's work turned people's attention to "transaction costs,"
particularly to Coase's theory that transaction costs are what account for the
legal system. Transaction costs are only a subset of the costs of moving
resources, however, and often are a fairly small subset. If I loaded my TV
into my van and drove it to New York, getting it there would be costly.
These would not be "transaction costs," however, except for those involving
the gasoline, tolls, and perhaps a motel room that I purchase along the way.
Indeed, Coase argued in his well known 1937 article on "The Nature of the
Firm" that minimization of all kinds of costs, including transaction costs,
determines which things a firm will do for itself internally and which it will
purchase on a market.9 For example, cleaning the office windows could be
done by the firm's own employees or else by contracting with a window
washing service. When it makes this decision the firm really does not care
that one of these is a "transaction" cost while the other is not. The only
thing that really matters is which costs less.
The term "transaction costs" is overused in law and economics. In
particular, it should not describe costs that have nothing to do with
transactions. For me to wash my own windows is costly, but using my own
labor is not a transaction cost. Often nontransaction costs are wrapped up
7

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 5 (1981), who complained that the neoclassical approach avoided
"all of the interesting questions,' because
The world with which it is concerned is a frictionless one in
which institutions do not exist and all change occurs through
perfectly operating markets. In short, the costs of acquiring
information, uncertainty, and transactions costs do not exist.
SEE ALSO MARTIN HOLLIS AND EDWARD NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN:
A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 233
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1975); Charles K. Rowley, "RentSeeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities" 18, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS (Charles K.
Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock, eds. 1988).
8
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
9
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386
(1937).
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into a bargain in such a way that the entire bargain looks like transaction
costs. For example, if I am an apple grower selling to a buyer 50 miles
away, they will need to be shipped. Shipping could clearly be part of our
negotiated transaction. Shipping in this case is not a "transaction" cost,
however, but rather a cost of resource movement. If I grew my apples in
one place and owned a fruit stand 50 miles away I would still have to ship
them, even though no transactions are necessarily involved. I might load
them onto my own truck and drive them to the fruit stand myself. Whether
or not I "transact," the apples must still be moved.
For Pigou, "transaction costs" were only a subset of the "costs of
movement," or of getting resources from one place to another.10
Nevertheless, his conclusions were the same that Coase would come to later
about transaction costs. Coase observed that if the costs of making a
transaction were greater than the increase in value that resulted from
transfer of a legal entitlement to a higher value position, then the transaction
would not occur. He began with the traditional economic observation that
resources under free choice move from lower to higher value uses. But then
he added the important qualifier that this "assumed costless market
transactions." Further,
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into
account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be
undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent
upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be
involved in bringing it about. When it is less, the granting of an
injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the liability
to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued (or may
prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if market
transactions were costless. In these conditions the initial delimitation
of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the
economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may bring
10

ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, pt. II, ch. III,
§3 (4th ed. 1932). See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and
Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (2012); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and
Economics, 86 IND.L.J. 499, 504 (2011). Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, The
Problem of Resource Access , 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1483-93 (2013)
(using the term "resource allocation costs"); Harold Demsetz, The Problem
of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou
and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2011) (acknowledging the
differences between transaction and other resource movement costs).
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about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is
the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs
of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through
the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights,
and the greater value of production which it would bring, may never
be achieved.11
Pigou had made exactly the same point, but he spoke more globally
of the "costs of movement," which encompassed all the costs of getting a
resource from one use to another:
Suppose that between two points A and B the movement of a
unit of resources can be effected at a capital cost equivalent to an
annual charge of n shillings for every year during which a unit that
is moved continues in productive work in its new home. In these
circumstances the national dividend will be increased by the
movement of resources from A to B, so long as the annual value of
the marginal social net product at B exceeds that at A by more than
n shillings....12
Many of the things that Pigou included as costs of movement were
ones that Coase later characterized as transaction costs.13 In addition,
however, were many other costs, including lack of information, education,14
transportation,15 and commuting distances and times for workers.16 He also
observed that reducing these costs of movement enabled a division of labor,
resulting in cheaper or better quality goods.17 Pigou noted that machine
production reduced the demand for skilled labor, and that unskilled laborers
could generally be redeployed at lower cost than skilled workers. This
11

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16
(1960). See also Coase's Nobel Prize lecture. Ronald H. Coase, The
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1992).
12
PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Pt. II, ch. III, §3 at 138.
13
E.g., id. at Id. pt. II, ch. VII, § 1, at 158:
[P]ayments that have to be made to various agents in the capital
market, promoters, financing syndicates, investment trusts,
solicitors, bankers, and others, who, in varying degrees according to
the nature of the investment concerned, help in the work of
transporting capital from its places of origin to its places of
employment.
14
Id. at pt. II, Ch. 6 ("Hindrance to the Equality of Returns Due to
Imperfect Knowledge"_)
15
Id. Part II, Ch. 17, and Ch. 18 on the effect of railroad rate structures.
16
Part III, Ch. 9, §10.
17
Id., Part III., Ch. 9, 10.
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enabled workers to be shifted more cheaply as product needs changed.18
Relative Deadweight Loss
The costs of movement in general, or transaction costs in particular,
are sometimes described as an economic deadweight loss.19 But that
conclusion is meaningless unless we ask "compared to what?" For
example, we speak of the deadweight loss of monopoly only by comparing
it to a competitive economy, or else to some alternative market thought to
be more competitive.20 If the norm is a frictionless economy in which
everything moves costlessly from one use to another, then any cost of
movement is a deadweight loss. But no one lives in such an economy. A
more useful definition is that a cost of moving a resource is a deadweight
loss to the extent that it is more costly than equally good and available
alternatives. Ceteris paribus, going from more to less costly means of
moving resources will generally produce gains that exceed any losses,
provided that nonparties are not adversely affected. An important corollary
is that a search for greater efficiency, assuming that is our goal, requires us
continuously to seek out lower costs of moving resources around.
The Choice of an Initial Position
Another important corollary, stressed by Pigou and later Calabresi
but not by Coase, is that it is often efficient to ensure that resources are
initially placed in their highest value use, making further movement
unnecessary.21 For example, Pigou was particularly concerned about the
extent to which workers were often initially assigned to low value
occupations, largely because of family tradition or lack of education.22
18

Ibid.
Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55
VILL.L.REV. 577, 579 (2010); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of
Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1635, 1683-84 (2006); Frieder Frasch, Transaction Costs
of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in German Companies, 7
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 48 (2007).
20
See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §1.3 (4th ed. 2011).
21
See PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Pt. II, ch. 3, §3.
22
Id., Pt. III, Ch. 9, §§5-7:
The most fundamental way in which the first of these causes,
ignorance, operates is by impairing the initial distribution of new
generations of workpeople as they flow into industry. Those
persons who direct the choice of avocations made by young men and
19
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Coasean efficiency is undermined by externalities whose costs
cannot be internalized because transaction costs are too high. For example,
the noise of Bridgman's machine is a resource conflict the parties will have
to resolve by bargaining. If the legal system assigns the right to the wrong
person, high transaction costs may prevent it from being transferred to the
correct one. For an individual making a resource choice, the cost of a bad
initial decision can be an negative externality if it does not fall upon the
person who made it but the cost of movement away from the initial position
are high.
To illustrate, suppose that upon entering the confection trade Bridgman
could have chosen between two equally suitable buildings that cost the
same. He chose the one that later created the conflict with Sturges. The
other building would be occupied by a different noise making business that
was not bothered by Bridgman's mortar & pestle. At this point relocating to
the alternative place would cost £25, but initially it would have cost
Bridgman the same amount to move into either location. That lost £25
shows up now to the extent that reciprocal bargaining obliges either
Bridgman or Sturges to pay it, depending on how the law assign's liability.
For example, if the law finds against Sturges, holding that there is no
nuisance, then Sturges must pay Bridgman at least £25 to get him to move.
On the other hand, if Bridgman had moved into the correct place to begin
with, neither would have to pay and society would be £25 richer.
The law and economics of traffic accidents takes a very different
approach to this problem. It considers the full market in which automobiles
operate rather than the relationship between two automobiles approaching
each other.23 For example, the nationwide American rules requiring driving
on the right side of the road, or that automobiles must yield to trains at
grade crossings, ensure that operators do not have to engage in pairwise
bargaining later. These are basically "zoning" rules for the road, which rely
on conventions or cost avoidance as a surrogate for bargaining. Their goal
is to get people into the right place from the beginning, so that subsequent
women entering industry are ignorant both of the level at which the
demand price for any given quantity of labour of any given grade
will stand in different occupations at a later period of those young
persons' lives, and also of what the quantity of labour offering itself
in those different occupations at that period will be.
On the problem today, see Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin, "Improving
Efficiency in School Choice," 170-188, in THE HANDBOOK OF MARKET
DESIGN (Nir Vulkan, et al., eds. 2013).
23
Mainly in GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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bargaining will not be necessary. The premise for state enforced traffic
rules is that greater government intervention is needed because individual
bargaining is less likely to be effective. When all the relevant costs of land
use externalities are considered, however, including the cost of not being in
the right place from the beginning, the differences between traffic rules and
zoning rules become relatively insignificant.
Coasean Markets
Ronald Coase's name is widely associated with the role of
transaction costs in the economy, and their relationship to the legal system.
Those who have peered into Coase have seen a variety of things, many of
which Coase himself did not see or would have rejected. But the markets
that are central to the functioning of the legal system in Coase's analysis
have some distinctive features. One is Coase's quite narrow conception of
"efficiency."24 A second is that Coasean markets are very small. How small
they are is determined by the costs of movement, both transactional and
nontransactional, from a given starting position.25 A third feature of
Coasean markets is that moving resources within them requires unanimous
agreement of the relevant participants. As Coase himself acknowledged
more than once, this fact has important implications for the efficacy of
bargained solutions as the number of bargainers increases.26
Identifying the "Efficient" Outcome
Traditional markets typically have large numbers of buyers and
sellers, but a single buyer and a single seller are sufficient to make a trade.
For example, if I buy a loaf of bread in a competitive market from my
grocer, both the grocer and I are better off. The market for bread contains
many other buyers and sellers who did not participate in this transaction.
They are largely indifferent to my particular deal, except to the extent that
one or more of them had been competing for my trade, or that I took the last
loaf on the shelf. In some cases others will use information about my trade
to inform their own choices. They will go on to make their trades with
others. While a particular transaction occurs at the "micro" level, the
overall market could be very large, perhaps even nationwide or worldwide.
These traditional markets are not the ones contemplated in The
Problem of Social Cost. There, the trade and the market are the same size.27
Think back to Sturges v. Bridgman, which Coase used to illustrate how
24

See discussion infra, text at notes ___.
See discussion infra, text at notes ___.
26
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
27
See discussion infra, text at notes ___.
25
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private bargaining could resolve the dispute without the intervention of the
legal system. Rather than thinking of one party as a victim of a
wrongdoer’s negative externality, Coase argued, we should treat each as
having a tradeable property interest that conflicts with the interest of the
other. They are like two people vying to park their cars in the same spot.
Assuming that they bargain, the winner will be the person who places the
higher value on the right. Suppose Sturges values the right to be free of the
noise by £100, while Bridgman values the right to use his noisy machine by
£60. Suppose also that the law said Sturges would lose his lawsuit because
the noise from the mortar & pestle is not sufficient to constitute a nuisance.
In that case Sturges would pay Bridgman a sum between £60 and £100,
Bridgman would shut down the machine, and both parties would be better
off. For example, if Sturges paid Bridgman £75, Bridgman would be £15
better off and Sturges would be £25 better off.. Suppose, however, that the
law of London provided that the machine was a nuisance, entitling Sturges
to an injunction shutting it down. Bridgman might wish to settle with a
money payment, but the most he would pay is £60 and the least Sturges
would accept is £100. No settlement would occur and the injunction would
shut the machine down.
This story illustrates both the "invariance" corollary and the
"efficiency" corollary of the Coase Theorem.28 The invariance corollary is
somewhat counterintuitive and its domain has been controversial.29 The
decision whether Bridgman's mortar & pestle continues to operate is not
determined by whether it is an unlawful nuisance, but rather by the
respective values that the two parties place on the right in question. In its
strongest form, the theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs
common law rules have nothing whatsoever to do with how resources are
allocated, although they may force some money to change hands. In the
nuisance jurisdiction the mortar & pestle is shut down and neither party
pays anything to the other. In the no-nuisance jurisdiction the mortar &
28

See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 100-104 (2004).
29
For example, under declining marginal utility or an "endowment
"effect, it may not hold true, at least not for human actors or firms that are
not risk neutral. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment
Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal
Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (1990); Daniel
Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). See also Russell Korobkin,
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228
(2003).
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pestle is also shut down, but this time physician Sturges pays Bridgman a
settlement payment between £60 and £100. In order for the invariance
thesis to apply the rights in question have to be "alienable," which means
that they can be traded through private settlement of a lawsuit. Common
law rights are generally alienable in this fashion. However, most statutory
rights or public regulations are not. For example, if a zoning ordinance
forbad operation of noisy machinery in this neighborhood, the parties would
not be able to negotiate to the efficient settlement because a neighbor
typically has no right to "waive" his neighbor's obligations under the zoning
statute.
The efficiency corollary of the Coase theorem states that in a well
functioning market the outcome will be "efficient," which means that it
maximizes the wealth of the two parties, and thus social wealth assuming
that no one else is affected. The Coasean bargain assigns the disputed
interest to the person who values it most highly. In the given example, the
physician's right to be free of the noise is worth £100, while the
confectioner's right to create the noise is worth only £60. Forcibly granting
the right to the confectioner would destroy £100 in resources in favor of a
value of only £60. Thus the "efficient" outcome is defined as the one that
produces the £100 right.
Describing this as the "efficient" outcome is idiosyncratic, however,
in one important sense. Again, we must ask "compared to what?" Clearly
an even more efficient outcome would be one in which both Sturges and
Bridgman could conduct their business without interference from the other.
This would generate total value of £160. Coase did not consider this a
viable alternative because he took the location of Sturges and Bridgman in
the same building as a given.
Micromarkets, Resource Movement, and Efficiency
Coasean thinking focused economic analysis of law on
"micromarkets," or situations involving very small groups of traders who
are locked together by some preexisting commitment, whether it be tenancy
in a duplex, neighbors in a subdivision, automobiles speeding toward one
another, an unhappy marriage, or disputes between shareholders and
managers in a single corporation.30
One problem with these Coasean markets is that they are rarely very
competitive. Sturges and Bridgman have only each other to bargain with,
and bilateral monopolies of this sort often lead to difficulty in reaching
30

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010)
at Ch. 5 (family law), ch. 6 (torts), Ch. 14 (Corporations and other business
organizations); Ch. 15 (financial markets).
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outcomes. One problems with bilateral monopolies is that they increase
transaction costs because there is no competition to discipline each person's
ask or offer prices. Joint maximization may be frustrated by each person's
incentive to hide information from the other.31 These problems are
exacerbated as Coasean markets more actors because unanimity is a
precondition to trading. Such markets are not strictly speaking "bilateral"
monopolies. Nevertheless, they have all the efficiency challenging
characteristics of bilateral monopolies, often magnified.32
London in 1879 undoubtedly had hundreds of physicians, hundreds
of confectioners, and thousands of duplexes or other buildings suitable for
business. Ordinarily we would think of these things when talking about
markets. Physicians compete with each other, as do confectioners and
landlords. But the "market" at issue in Coase's article was a peculiar one,
limited to a single physician, a single confectioner and a single building.
What makes this relationship between solitary Sturges and solitary
Bridgman a "market"? The answer is that prior commitments plus the costs
of movement define this market's boundaries. Sturges and Bridgman are
stuck together by virtue of a previous investment each of them had made in
the same building.33 For example, suppose as before that Sturges valued the
right to be free of Bridgman's noise at £100, while Bridgeman valued the
right to make it at £60. But suppose that for £35 Bridgman could move to
an equally good location with no noise or other conflict and no harm to his
business. No matter how liability was assigned, Bridgman would move. In
a nuisance jurisdiction he would move rather than shut down. In a no
31

See Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, & Richard E. Romano, A
Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S.ECON. J. 831 (1989).
On bilateral monopoly and the Coase Theorem, see Robert Cooter, The Cost
of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). Among the earliest observations of
indeterminacy in strictly bilateral trading is F.Y. EDGEWORTH,
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF
MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 29-33 (1881); Fritz Machlup &
Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical
Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960).
32
See discussion infra, text at notes ___.
33
Cf. "lock in' as a theory justifying very small markets in antitrust
cases. For example, those who already own a Kodak photocopier are
locked in to an ongoing supply of service and repair parts, thus making
"Kodak parts" or "Kodak service" a relevant market as to them. See
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458-459
(1992) (accepting this theory), critiqued in 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶564 (4th ed. 2013).
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nuisance jurisdiction Sturges would pay him to move, which would require
less than paying him to shut down. If Bridgman had moved to a location
with less conflict to begin with, however, his moving costs would be zero.
Coase had actually recognized this in 1937, in The Nature of the
Firm. A profit-maximizing firm would compare the cost of operating in its
current location against the cost of moving elsewhere, and choose the value
maximizing solution.34 The message of Coase's 1937 article is that when
we consider the problem of Sturges and Bridgman, focusing exclusively on
transaction costs and on the micromarket that their dispute created can lead
us astray. Rather, we should consider all of the costs of moving resources,
including transaction costs, as well as the full range of places and times
where movement can occur. The differences can be important. Coase's
approach in The Nature of the Firm compared the cost of transacting against
the cost of getting something done by any other means, not limited to
transactions. A value maximizing firm would do exactly that. For those
purposes, the cost of redeploying resources initially invested badly would
also be a cost. The cheapest cost avoider gets it right the first time.
By focusing exclusively on transaction costs from a position defined
by previous investment, Coasean thinking shifted our attention to
micromarkets. In each case, however, the situation creates a market
because a previous choice (whether cooperative or unilateral) binds the two
actors together and extraction is costly. Sturges and Bridgman had a
conflict because they were already established in their locations. If the costs
of movement were sufficiently low, however, the optimal outcome could be
for one of the parties simply to move away. But suppose that we had been
able to steer one of them to a different location to begin with, a policy that
Pigou advocated strenuously.35 In that case the cost of movement could
have been even lower, certainly less than the cost of moving to one address
and then relocating to another. This observation is relevant to many of
Coase's examples. The truly efficient solution to Sturges v. Bridgman is the
one that permits each of them to operate without interference by the other.
Further, the most efficient version of that choice is likely to be one that
defines their property interests in such a way that they never become
neighbors in the first place.
In an example that Coase used frequently, once a polluting
smokestack and a residential neighborhood are constructed and in place,
bargaining assigns the right to the highest value set of participants. 36 But an
even higher value could obtain if a zoning law forbad smokestacks and
34

Coase, Nature of the Firm, note ___.
See discussion supra, text at notes ___.
36
Coase, Problem of Social Cost, note __ at 1-2, 11-13.
35
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homes from locating in close proximity to begin with -- or perhaps if the
parties had the foresight to see into the future and bargain about location
before making any initial investment. The Coasean reasoning forces us to
think of the "market" as the relationship between neighbors whose uses are
already in place, in the process ignoring a larger market that presented a
greater array of choices.
In his writing about automobile accidents, Guido Calabresi took a
fundamentally different approach. In one of the first articles to cite "The
Problem of Social Cost" Walter Blum and Harry Kalven from the
University of Chicago had noted the importance of Coase's work in
assessing resource conflict. They concluded that it could not be applied to
automobile accidents, however. In traffic collision cases people do not
know in advance who their bargaining opposites are until it is too late, and
there are significant other limitations to their ability to bargain over such
issues as the right of way.37 Calabresi responded that the way to think about
the problem is to imagine who would have won the bargain in a regime in
which bargaining had been possible. Under bargaining in a well
functioning market, the person who ends up taking the precaution is the one
in a position to avoid the accident at the lowest cost. Thus the "cheapest
cost avoider" entered the lexicon of law and economics.38
While Calabresi was responding to a problem of extremely high
transaction costs, his solution to the traffic accident problem is not about
transaction costs at all, but about the generally nontransactional costs of
movement. For example, consider the common law rule that at grade level
railroad crossings trains have the right of way over cars. The rationale is
fairly simple: it costs a great deal more to stop and restart a train than to
stop and restart a car. If the train would incur costs of $2.00 while the car
37

Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a
Private Law Problem -- Auto Compensation Plans, 31 UNIV. CHI.L.REV.
641 (1964). See Steven G. Medema, "Rethinking Market Failure: 'The
Problem of Social Cost' Before the 'Coase Theorem'" (SSRN working
paper, Jan. 25, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188728.
38
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135 & n.1 (1970). Calabresi observed that these costs
were not transaction costs at all, but rather alternatives, or substitutes, for
transacting. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation
and Liability Rules -- A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968). Coase
had observed in relation to pairwise bargaining that when transaction costs
are high the legal system should assign the right initially to the person who
placed the highest value on it. Coase, Social Cost, note __ at 15-17.
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would incur costs of 20 cents, then the parties would bargain for an
outcome in which the train would have the right of way. If payment were
necessary, the amount would be somewhere between 20 cents and $2.00.
But while this problem can be recast as one in transaction costs, it is
not really a transaction cost problem at all, but a problem related to the
mechanical and energy costs of stopping and restarting heavier vs. lighter
vehicles. Indeed, the fact that the problem relates to engineering or
mechanical costs rather than bargaining costs is what permits us to
generalize across the full range of similar conflicts. Thinking of the problem
as one in bargaining is an interesting metaphor, but it does not add anything
to the solution. It indicates only the truism that the costs of movement that
require a bargain are always at least as great as the costs of movement
alone. If we required a transaction, then the higher total costs of reaching
the right result would make the good outcome less certain, but that is only
because we have added the complexity of a completely unnecessary
bargain. Or to say this differently, in the railroad/automobile grade crossing
situation the correct rule is determined by assessing the cost of moving
resources, and imagining a hypothetical bargain adds only an unnecessary
complication.
Neither can this problem be reduced to one about the correct assignment
of default rules. Default provisions are critical in situations where the
parties must bargain but high transaction costs or an endowment effect
obstructs trading to a higher value. In that case it makes sense to assign the
default in favor of the person who would end up with the right.39 In other
situations, such as most of those involving traffic rules or zoning
restrictions, the legal entitlements are inalienable, and thus they stay with
the person to whom they are originally assigned.
On the other hand, a type of default rule can also apply to a
government's decision about how to allocate resources when initial
decisions might be erroneous. For example, the variance system in zoning
ordinances creates a limited default rule with a relatively high burden.
Zoning might separate industrial from residential uses but then give
individual owners relief from provable mistakes that render the
government's initial decision suboptimal.40 In general, the legal system's
39

See Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and Coase Theorem, supra note
__; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U.L.REV. 106,
110-112 (2002); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.REV. 608 (1998).
40
E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)
(municipality acted unconstitutionally when it zoned petitioner's property in
such a way as to make it worthless, and thus required to grant individual
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provision of constitutional or legislative challenges to government decisions
that would otherwise create inalienable rights or burdens operate as default
rules.
One important difference between transaction costs and nontransactional costs of movement is that the latter typically relate to
engineering, transportation, or sometimes social convention (such as driving
on the right side of the road). These are all processes that are capable of
evaluation by outsider observers. By contrast, transaction costs depend on
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept -- numbers that are subjective
and much more difficult to observe, particularly if we are talking about
natural persons rather than business firms. When we think about good
traffic rules, casting the problem in terms of one person's willingness-to-pay
and another's willingness-to-accept simply misses the important point and
overly subjectifies what is fundamentally a problem in risk management.
For example, a civil engineer's observations about appropriate rules for
trains and cars at grade crossings gives us much better and more useful
information than any notion about the states of mind or the bargaining
strategies of the operators.
Nontransactional costs of movement can more easily be predicted
across categories of persons or technologies when our thinking is not
complicated by the need to consider hypothetical bargains. Actual
bargaining can involve us with noneconomic values or behavioral issues
that often serve to interfere with efficient bargaining outcomes.41 It can also
be subject to disguising of information or strategic behavior.42 Coase
ignored these issues, even as he insisted that the problem be cast as one of
bargaining. A much more direct route to the same result is to ignore
bargaining altogether in situations where bargaining is unnecessary or
bargaining metaphors unhelpful. If what we really mean by efficient
outcomes is competitive market value, a social concept based on observed
costs, then assuming a bargain only gets in the way.

relief). For a bargaining perspective, see Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and
Dealing: the Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning
Conflicts, 7 HARV.NEGOT.L.REV. 337 (2002).
41
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826 (2013); Ryan Bubb &
Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims its Sails and Why, 127
HARV.L.REV. ___ (forthcoming 2014).
42
On these problems in bilateral monopoly, see Blair, et al., note __.
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The Role of Liberty of Contract
When we think of legal conflicts in terms of the cost of moving
resources rather than simply the costs of bargaining, the link between
liberty of contract as an ideology and outcomes in the legal system becomes
weaker. This is not to say that bargaining or the right to bargain is not
important. In many situations the legal system does and should defer to
parties' contractual judgments rather than the objectively defined costs of
moving resources. Buyers and sellers in competitive commercial markets
make highly individual choices about who to transact with, what to buy, and
how much to pay. People who are of age have a right to select each other
for marriage, even if friends believe that this particular resource movement
is a bad idea and may lead to costly re-movement in the future.
But imagining bargains in situations where they are unnecessary, as
the Coasean analysis sometimes does, may force us to identify particular
solutions as desirable even though more satisfactory solutions are available.
On the illustrative numbers given above, the "efficient" solution to Sturges
v. Bridgman is for Bridgman to shut down his mortar & pestle, thus
preserving Sturges' more valuable interest. But this solution is efficient
only because we are viewing it myopically, within the context of a
micromarket that the parties' own prior decisions had created. Once we
look at the bigger market where the services of physicians and confectioners
are sold, then solutions are likely to emerge in which both Sturges and
Bridgman can continue to operate.
This observation extends to a wide variety of circumstances, such as the
proverbial smokestack industry and the downwind home owners. Once the
parties have invested in their position they become the relevant market for
bargaining purposes, and the efficient solution will prefer one use over the
others. But earlier, before their positions have been established, a range of
much more competitive solutions is available that can permit both uses to
survive. This helps to explain why more than a half century of Coasean
analysis has not placed a noticeable dent in the prevalence of basic zoning
rules that segregate polluting industry from residential uses. When we think
about the initial assignment in such settings, pairwise bargaining is not in
the cards. The relevant actors are not the established smokestack and the
established home owner. Rather, they are more like the random pair of
automobiles driving in the same county, not yet aware that they may later
be in a position of conflict.
When we examine the cost of traffic collisions and the cheapest way
of avoiding them, the imaginary bargain that we use to identify who would
have won the right of way is only a "bargain" in a loose metaphorical sense.
Ultimately these questions reduce to ones of engineering, technical ability
or superiority, or some other factor that has nothing to do with a bargain.
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Deciding whether the train or the car should yield the right of way is
fundamentally not a problem in bargaining. Making it into one involves
many behavioral and transactional complexities, while giving nothing in
return.
Such solutions do limit property and contract rights to the extent that
they forbid individuals from creating harmful externalities in the first place.
Perhaps land occupants should have a property right or liberty of contract to
invest in any activity and resolve externality issues later, perhaps by making
a costly divestment. It's more difficult to make an argument that automobile
drivers should have a right to drive on whichever side of the road they
please, bargaining to yield whenever traffic approaches. Drivers don't own
the roads and consent to traffic rules are a price of admission. But that
answer is unsatisfactory. One characteristic of most externalities is that
they have no respect for property lines, whether it is Bridgman's noise or the
polluter's smoke. Accepting the Coasean analysis, however, entails that we
have already subordinated these liberty rights to concerns about efficiency.
Many Player Coasean Markets
Making a trade requires at least two people but typically not more.
In the traditional markets that have dominated classical and neoclassical
economics, the number of people who make a trade is only a small subset of
the market's total participants. For example, the competitive market for
bread contains thousands of buyers and sellers, but a trade requires only one
of each, and the rest of the market is largely indifferent.
Coasean markets are different because trading requires an agreement
of all market participants. Even in the two person setting, such as Sturges
and Bridgman, this market functions less well than a competitive market
because it is a bilateral monopoly. Each one can trade only with the other.43
When Coasean markets have more than two participants, additional
complications emerge. No deal will be made unless all participants agree.
As the number of bargainers necessary to make a trade increases and their
individual interests are more diverse, reaching a bargain becomes much
more difficult.44
43

See discussion supra, text at notes ___. See also OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 238-247 (1975) (on numerous difficulties of trading in less
than competitive markets).
44
On the relevance of diversity to transaction costs, see Carol M. Rose,
The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997); Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
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When three or more participants are involved, Coasean bargaining
can yield cycling problems, although they are somewhat different from the
cycling problems encountered in political (majority vote) markets. In
political markets a common problem is that any nonunanimous but initially
winning coalition can be defeated by a different nonunanimous coalition, as
developed in Condorcet's Paradox and later formalized by Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem.45 As a result, purely democratic markets can be
unstable unless the vote is unanimous.46
In the Coasean market an agreed upon solution is stable because it
would take unanimous consent to change it. The cycling problem shows up
in reaching the decision in the first place. Suppose a smokestack factory
belches smoke that injures 100 home owners but is in a non-nuisance
jurisdiction. The home owners must pay the smokestack if they want to
shut it down. That payment will theoretically occur if the aggregate value
that the home owners place on freedom from smoke is greater than the
value that the factory places on continued operation. But how will the
payment be divided among the home owners? A coalition of the most
nearby home owners may agree on an equal payment for everyone, but
more remote home owners will object that they are injured less by the
smoke and thus place a lower value on its removal. Or those who have
property interests that are less valuable or less vulnerable to smoke damage
will argue that payments should be proportioned to harm. Or some home
owners may object that the prevailing winds force the smoke into a path that
injures some home owners more than others. The result could be an endless
set of proposals, coalitions and counterproposals, with no proposal ever
achieving the unanimous consent that is needed. The same thing could
45

KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUE (2d
ed. 1963). On the Theorem's relation to governance, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government,
75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990).
On voting cycles in democratic nonunanimous decision making, see
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III at 67-179 (2003).
46
See Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 UNIV. CHI.L.REV. 1073
(2010); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA.L.REV.
339 (1988); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 23, 38-39 (1991). On the implications
of Condorcet's paradox on democratic institutions, particularly where
preferences are not naked but are arrayed around specific policies or
ideologies, see WILLIAM V. GEHRLEIN & DOMINIQUE LEPELLEY, VOTING
PARADOXES AND GROUP COHERENCE: THE CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF
VOTING RULES (2013)
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happen in a nuisance jurisdiction where the value of operating the factory is
greater than the injury to the home owners. In that case the factory would
be willing to compensate the home owners, but only after they agree on
how the compensation should be divided. The same problems emerge.
Even when unanimous consent is initially achieved, Coasean
bargaining rules are suboptimal when they make it more difficult to account
for changed circumstances. Rules initially established by unanimous
consent might later become inefficient. If unanimous consent is required to
change them, however, there will be holdouts that prevent the change from
taking place. That is, the Coasean market produces excessive stability.
Some residential subdivisions whose uses are controlled by private
servitudes have attempted to solve this problem by permitting
nonunanimous voting to change an existing restriction that is no longer
desirable. But switching to nonunanimous rules simply substitutes one
cycling problem for another. The nonunanimous rules have all the defects
of democratic voting systems generally.47
Coase himself recognized the problem of bargaining in markets with
large numbers of players. He was particularly concerned with smoke
pollution, writing about it in both his 1959 article on the Federal
Communications Commission and a year later in The Problem of Social
Cost. One can speculate that his interest resulted from his earlier life spent
in heavily polluted London. In The Federal Communications Commission,
Coase observed that "when large numbers of people are involved, the
argument for the institution of property rights is weakened and that for
general regulations becomes stronger." Speaking of smoke pollution in
particular, he acknowledged that "if many people are harmed and there are
several sources of pollution, it is more difficult to reach a satisfactory
solution through the market." As a result, "in these circumstances it may be
preferable to impose special regulations...."48
In The Problem of Social Cost a year later Coase returned to smoke
pollution.49 Interestingly, his most extensive discussion was of Bryant v.
Lefever, a dispute between a single defendant and a single plaintiff. Coase
himself acknowledged that the situation was "novel." The nuisance dispute
arose when the defendant rebuilt his house, giving it a higher roofline that
prevented the plaintiff's chimney from clearing its smoke. 50 Coase later
47

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasean Markets: Servitudes
and Alternative Land-Use Controls, 27 J.CORP. L. 519 (2002).
48
Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 27, 29 (1959).
49
See Coase, Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 at 1-2, 11-13.
50
Id. at 11, discussing Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878-1879).
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addressed the "standard case of a smoke nuisance ...[that] may affect a vast
number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities." Coase conceded
that private bargaining might not be able to determine the result and that we
might wish to call upon the "government" as a "super-firm" to use an
"administrative decision" to solve the problem. 51
Coase also discussed the problem of railroad trains that throw sparks
from their engines, sometimes causing fires on nearby land.52 The relevant
cost to the individual land owners is the probability that a fire will occur on
their property multiplied by the expected amount of damage. The relevant
cost to the railroads is the cost of minimizing the sparks, perhaps by
proceeding more slowly or installing spark suppressing technology or
switching fuels, or perhaps even by ceasing operation or relocating.
A single railroad line might pass by hundreds of landowners, and a
deal with any one of them will not bind the others. Suppose that the cost of
eliminating the sparks is less than the risk-adjusted cost of expected injury
to the land owners. In a well functioning Coasean market the parties would
bargain to a solution in which the railroad eliminated the sparks by some
means. If the parties are in a nuisance jurisdiction the outcome is fairly
simple: no deal will result. The most the railroad is willing to pay will be
less than the value the land owners place on being free from the risk
imposed by the sparks. The railroad will have to take whichever avoidance
mechanism is effective and cheapest.
But what if the parties are in a no-nuisance jurisdiction. The land
owners will have to pay off the railroad. We can assume that the gross
amount of the payment is easy to compute because it applies to the railroad
alone. For example, if effective spark arresting technology cost $1 million,
the railroad would accept any amount in excess of that. But how is the
payment to be divided up among the, say, 1000 landowners adjoining the
tracks? First, they are very likely quite diverse. Some have grazing land
adjoining the tracks, making the expected cost of spark-induced fire
relatively small. Others may have houses or other buildings close by, and
for them the expected cost of a fire will be much greater. Some may have
100 feet of frontage along the tracks while others have 500, greatly
increasing their exposure. Some may be in a direction that is persistently
upwind while others are downwind.
The result will be either underinvestment in efficient technologies or
The Bryant court used the type of "wrongdoer" analysis that Coase rejected
-- namely that while making smoke and injuring a neighbor might be a
nuisance, in this case the plaintiff was being injured by his own smoke.
51
Coase, Social Cost, note __ at 17.
52
Id. at 29-32
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activities, or else a great deal of negotiating and cycling through various
alternatives. For example, the land owners may form coalitions whose
members can be siphoned off by alternative coalitions. Small owners might
agree to pay $2000 each, leaving large land owners with $5000. But then a
subgroup of the large land owners might reform as a coalition of those
having houses along the tracks, asking others to join them and offering
$4000 each.
In such a situation Coasean bargaining under a unanimous consent
rule can turn into endless cycling, with no agreement ever being reached.
The story is a little like Charles Dickens' Bleak House, where numerous
potential heirs and devisees contested a will, each asking for more than
someone else or trying to exclude others until the entire estate was
consumed by litigation costs. The parties would have been much better off
if they had been able to agree, but an agreement would have required
unanimous consent among all of those with a colorable claim.
Each land owner will have a tendency to understate his exposure,
thus making his share of the payment smaller. In addition, each landowner
knows that once the spark arrester is installed it will benefit everyone, so
they may be able to get away without paying anything at all. 53 That is to
say, some many player Coasean markets effectively become markets for
public goods in the sense that a costly but efficient fix, once installed,
benefits the entire affected population. The railroad cannot insist on
individual payment by selectively denying protection.54
Coase himself recognized the public goods character of some
Coasean markets. In his article on "The Lighthouse in Economics" he noted
a history in which lighthouses were privately financed with harbor taxes
charged against ships who came and went.55 But Coase never adequately
addressed the problem of ships that simply passed by, benefitting from the
lighthouse but not required to pay the tax. The lighthouses were never
really private, and to the extent they were they failed.56 In any event, the
harbor tax was assessed by a government agency or its equivalent.
53

On whether the problem of nonpayment by free riders is a "transaction
cost,” see HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM
116-117 (2008) (arguing that it is not).
54
See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO
DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 49-50 (2000) (noting the public
goods problem in some Coasean markets).
55
Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357
(1974).
56
See Elodie Bertrand, The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing:
Myths and Realities, 30 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 389 (2006).
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Bargaining problems in many player Coasean markets have
numerous real world manifestations. Most obviously is the question
whether land uses are best allocated legislatively through the zoning system
or else by private bargaining. In the first two decades after "The Problem of
Social Cost" was published, several writers advocated private restrictive
covenants as efficient alternatives to legislative zoning.57 Pairwise
resolution of disputes among people who have already made their
investments will always be suboptimal, however, if the investments
themselves are suboptimal and extraction is costly. If we want maximizing
solutions -- the kind where both Sturges and Bridgman can conduct their
business without costly mistaken investments -- then we must identify the
problems before the conflict arises. This entails a system more like the one
for traffic rules, which focuses on the enitre area in which resource conflicts
arise, on classes of users rather than individuals, and on the overall costs of
moving resources. In general, the more costly it is to move a poorly located
resource (such as a smokestack factor), the greater the value in getting it
right the first time.
Once we decide to allocate land uses over classes rather than
individuals, however, then the bargaining metaphor becomes no more than
that -- just a metaphor in which we substitute objective value, usually based
on market prices or historical costs, for subjective willingness to pay or
accept. Zoning and subdivision servitude decisions typically fall into this
category, involving questions such as how far commercial and
noncommercial uses should be separated from one another, whether
polluting or noise producing industry should be segregated, whether to have
separate professional and industrial parks, and so on. Assuming we can
predict correctly or even partially correctly, the costs of making the right
decisions before investment occurs are almost certain to be significantly
lower than the costs of fixing things later.
An alternative approach that is applied to private land use controls is
to re-conceptualize the problem of multi-player bargaining as a time series
57

E.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 UNIV. CHI.L.REV. 681
(1973); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972). See also
Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods,
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (1999); Robert H. Nelson, Contracting for Land
Use Law: Zoning by Private Contract, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating
Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 28 (1981).
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of pairwise contracts. That is what frequently happens when residential
subdivisions are initially developed. The developer draws up a list of land
use restrictions for a particular subdivision, typically by making an
economic prediction concerning the uses that will maximize subdivision
value. It places these restrictions into the chain of title. The developer then
sells homes individually, with each buyer agreeing to the restrictions. Once
the restrictions are in place and buyers have begun to purchase, acceptance
of the restrictions is largely mandatory -- take them or leave them. This
avoids the problem of dozens or hundreds of home owners having to
bargain at once. This “vertical” series of pairwise transactions must
eventually turn into a “horizontal” arrangement among the home owners,
who eventually take it over and operate it themselves under contract rules.
It would be as if Sturges and Bridgman had been obligated before making
their purchase (or lease) to agree to a covenant restricting the use of noisy
machinery. If such a covenant had been in place Bridgman would
presumably have decided to go elsewhere, where his machinery would not
interfere with Sturgis' stethoscope.
However, this approach would not solve the problem of previously
created servitudes that no longer serve their social purpose.58 We can still
expect post-agreement hyperstability. Restrictions remain enforceable even
after they serve to reduce rather than increase value. For example, if a
neighborhood has changed and surrounding areas gone commercial, a
significant majority may wish to profit by selling off their property for
commercial use. But a small number, perhaps those in the interior, want to
maintain the residential restrictions because they like where they are living
and the surrounding, similarly restricted homeowners provide a buffer.59 In
many such cases the courts have provided relief, but of course in so doing
they are imposing a judicial judgment that conflicts with the contract-based
judgment of the homeowners, and often where there is no obvious injury to
outsiders.60
In sum, while servitudes create a default rule, changing the default
requires unanimous consent. In general, this is a problem with many player
Coasean markets. Because the entitlements are alienable resources they can
58

See discussion supra, text at notes ___.
See, e.g., Redfern Lawns Civi Ass'n v. Currie Pontiac Co., 328 Mich.
463, 44 N.W.2d 8 (1950) (refusing to apply doctrine of changed conditions
to grant relief from a servitude where maintenance of single-family harm
restriction operated as buffer benefitting interior lots). See also Matthews v.
Winstanley, 2003 WL 22976411 (Mich. App. 2003) (similar).
60
For a critique, see Richard Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in
the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1983).
59

Hovenkamp

Resource Movement and Legal System

Oct. 2013, 24

be re-assigned. If re-assigning them requires unanimous consent, however,
that promise can be illusory, sort of like a zoning ordinance with no
provision for variances.
It also does not add much to say that efficient outcomes will emerge
when gainers from a certain rule can compensate the losers, who stand to
lose less than the gainers gain. If actual bargains were at issue, the
recipients would still have to agree with each other about how the
compensation is to be divided, or the payors would have to agree about how
the size of each person's obligation. The same cycling problems re-enter.61
Some private residential covenant schemes permit landowners to
amend servitudes by a non-unanimous vote -- often a supermajority such as
two thirds. But now we have substituted a legislative, or political market
for a contract market, and there is no obvious reason why it is not subject to
all of the difficulties of coalition formation that characterize such markets.
As a result the courts have frequently had to intervene to protect minority
rights. For example, several courts have held that even where a set of
restrictions permit changes by less-than-unanimous voting, unanimity
would be required for a proposed change that would affect only a single lot
in the subdivision.62
One might be tempted to say that the problem of reaching and
maintaining efficient outcomes in many player Coasean markets is simply
one of transaction costs.
These costs may become higher, even
insurmountable, in markets that have a large numbers of participants and
61

Cf. Franceseo Parisi, Political Coase Theorem, 115 PUB. CHOICE 1
(2003) (Coasean markets with zero transaction costs, single-peaked
preferences, and side payments could yield stable outcomes). In the
illustrations discussed in the text the preferences of individual land owners
are not single peaked because they divide different groups into different
categories that cannot be arrayed along a single line. For example, if one
considered only each landowner's distance from a smokestack, the array of
preferences might be single peaked. But different landowners might also
be engaged in different types of activity that is more or less harmed by
smoke, and this array might be uncorrelated with distance from the
smokestack. The aggregation of these two preference sets is not single
peaked. In any event, bargaining depends on declared willingness to pay or
accept, not on objective measurement of cost or profit. If we use the latter,
then we are no longer relying on a bargaining metaphor.
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that give rise to the formation of alternative coalitions. The issue is more
complex than that, however. If bargaining were in fact costless it could go
on forever. A rational decision maker would continue to bargain as long as
the expected value of improving one's position exceeded the cost of
continuing to bargain, which would be zero. Under zero cost bargaining
any possibility of an improvement would yield a further offer. Indeed, in
such situations it is more likely that positive, although manageable,
bargaining costs serve to induce equilibrium by making continued
bargaining costly.
Market Efficiency and the Long Run
Using the nuisance case of Sturges v. Bridgman as one illustration,
Coase's social cost analysis identified the efficient solution as the one where
the high value activity is preferred while the lower value user's activity is
shut down or perhaps ameliorated.63 This solution is "efficient," however,
only if we confine our analysis to the “micromarket” involving Sturges and
Bridgman, which is much smaller than the markets in which these activities
operate.64 Once we look at this broader market for confectioning,
doctoring, or small business generally, then it may be quite possible to have
solutions in which both activities can continue without harming one
another. In order to do that we would need to consider all of the costs of
moving resources, not merely those that are involved in transacting. We
must also examine the longer run, because an important part of the cost of
moving resources is correcting for previous mistakes. In most situations the
optimal course is to put them into the correct place to begin with.
Blum and Kalven were correct in 1964 that pairwise bargaining
would not work as between two automobiles facing an impending
collision.65 Calabresi responded with a solution that re-focused the
automobile accident question on the entire market in which such collisions
are likely to occur.66 Because bargaining is possible between neighbors
with stable relationships and predictible disputes, Coase was able to focus
on tiny markets that told us a great deal about bargaining but said little
about optimal allocations of resources in the greater markets in which these
activities occurred. The efficient solution to the Sturges v. Bridgman
problem is to separate their activities sufficiently that both can operate. But
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that requires broadening our vision to take into account the entire set of
market choices that these two people faced before they made their
investments in a particular location. That necessarily includes a much
larger area that encompasses both of their uses, as well as a longer period of
time. In the process, we will have involved a much greater number of
persons in the negotiating process.
As between two parties in a resource conflict, the person who places
the greatest value on a right after interests are in place is not necessarily the
one would have valued it most highly before they moved in. For example,
our hypothetical numbers assumed that Sturges' use of his stethoscope was
more valuable than Bridgman's use of his mechanical mortar and pestle.
However, looking ex ante it may also be true that it costs Bridgman much
more to relocate his bulky machine than it would cost Sturges to relocate his
lightweight stethoscope. In addition to assuming that Sturges valued use of
his stethoscope at £100 while Bridgman valued use of his mortar & pestle at
£60, suppose that it would cost Sturges only £25 to relocate while it would
cost Bridgman £40. In that case a more efficient outcome occurs when
Sturges moves and both parties continue their operations. If the jurisdiction
finds a nuisance, Bridgman will have to pay Sturges to move. If there is no
nuisance Sturges must pay his own moving costs. It's a point that should
not be lost. While professionals often have highly valuable occupations,
they also frequently have highly mobile assets. The cost of moving a law
office might be considerably less than the cost of re-locating a cement
production plant.
The most efficient solution to the Sturges/Bridgman problem is to
allocate property rights in such a way that the problem never arises in the
first place. Then we can have both confectioners and physicians. This
means that the initial position must be one from which further movement is
least likely to be necessary. For example, if we can assign Sturges' right to
a place where he will be free to practice without interference we would have
the social value of his activity, or £100. If we can do the same thing with
Bridgman we will also have the social value of his activity, or £60. Making
such decisions, however, almost always requires looking beyond Sturges
and Bridgman. While each building has only one actual owner, it may have
a very large number of potential owners. One relatively private approach to
the problem would be a set of servitudes that segregated business activities
by the amount of interference that they caused. For example, relatively
noisy activities such as confectioning could be assigned to one land area,
while "professional" activities such as practicing medicine could be
assigned to a different area. That immediately puts us into territory that
involves multi-player negotiating, however, and all of the problems
attending such markets, as discussed supra.

Hovenkamp

Resource Movement and Legal System

Oct. 2013, 27

At this point subjective bargaining analogies fail us, but there are
alternatives. The Arrovian theory of political markets and endless cycling
assumed "naked" voter preferences that were noncomparable from one actor
to another.67 But identification of the "cheapest cost avoider" in accident
law makes no such assumption. Instead of inferring "preferences," as
bargaining theory does, it looks directly at the problem of the cost of
moving resources, typically focusing on engineering costs, health costs,
productivity, or other factors that can be estimated directly from market
prices without using individual preference as a surrogate.
To be sure, such assignments can interfere with individual liberty in
ways that many would find offensive. For example, ex ante the market for
marriage is reasonably competitive, but the market for divorce is a bilateral
monopoly. This serves to explain why most divorces are more costly than
most weddings. But the long run fix would require the State to intervene in
the marriage market so as to ensure that only those couples married who
were likely to stay together.
In more purely economic settings the cheapest cost avoider analogy
works much better, and liberty rights do not need to encompass rights to
cause harm to others, particularly when the harm occurs outside of a
property owner's own boundaries. The State can act to prevent uses likely
to harm one another from ever coming into too close proximity in the first
place. This requires greater use of "objective" welfare judgments, made not
by assuming hypothetical agreements but rather by looking at the market
costs and benefits of specific courses of action.
Conclusion
We don't usually expect highway drivers to bargain over the right of
way. By the time the bargaining relationship is set up, it is too late. People
bargain in markets, but the market for optimal rules about rights of way
does not consist of a single pair of drivers confronting each other at the
danger point. Rather, it consists of all those driving on a jurisdiction's roads
who are in a position to have a resource conflict with one another. The
"cheapest cost avoider" solution is not a bargaining solution at all, but one
driven by engineering or safety concerns, or else it is simply a convention
that must be consistent over a larger number of transactions. For example,
driving on the right may not be inherently safer than driving on the left, but
a uniform rule for either side is certainly safer than permitting drivers to
negotiate with one another on a pairwise basis as they are approach.
Are markets involving more established pairwise relationships any
different? Coase thought so, because he accepted previously locked-in
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commitments as his starting point. Once Sturges and Bridgman are locked
into place, a bargaining analogy is helpful because it helps us determine
which is the least harmful among the alternatives available at that point. In
fact, however, a cheaper solution overall may be for one of the parties to
move, and an even cheaper solution may be an ex ante rule that forbids
them from locating in close proximity in the first place. Coase
underestimated the number of times that the State would have to be
involved in that choice.

